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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: The first is to develop an agent-based simulation 
model for simulating alliance formation processes of the business world, and to analyze 
stability of alliance structures generated by it. The second purpose is to apply the simulation 
model to the civil aviation industry for validating it as well as for obtaining insightful and 
unique findings about the industry. As the results, we find the alliances in the industry are 
basically formed for network connectivity rather than management complementarities. 
Wealso suggest possibility that American Airlines and British Airways may may get 
separated.  
Keywords 





We can observe alliance formations very commonly everywhere in the world and 
anytime in the history. On the present international political scene, for example, the US is 
eager to increase its alliance members for managing the Iraqi problem through formal and 
informal negotiations.  
The industrial world is not exception, of course. In particular, in the industries like 
banks, life insurance and chemical companies as well as the civil aviation industry, alliance 
formations are often drastic due to many and interacted factors such as business globalization, 
R&D cost management and changes of product life cycle. 
In most situations we can find not only traditional pairwise (company-to- company) 
coalitions but also alliances of a variety of sizes. The purpose of this paper is two-fold: The 
first is to develop an agent-based simulation model for simulating alliance formation 











it will keeptostayin itspresentallianceorleaveit. SincetheLandscapeTheory,eitheroriginalor
generalized,is mainlyinterestedin allianceformationprocess,whetherornotanalliancestructure


























keypremises.Thefirst is thateachpairofagents,i andj in N, haspropensity,pij , ¡1 • pij • 1,
toworktogether,whereN D f1;2; : : : ; ng denotesasetof agents.It is ameasureof howwilling
thetwoagentsaretobeinthesamealliancetogether.Thepropensityispositiveandlargeif thetwo
agentsgetalongwelltogetherandnegativeif theyhavemanysourcesofconflict.Tomakethetheory















It impliesthatanagentis notabletoseethewholeworlddueto itsboundedrationalitybutcan
estimate”reputation”aboutitself.
Underthosesettings,weformulateourmodelasfollows:Let N bea setof agents.Givenan
alliancestructureX, apartitionof N, wedefinedistancedij .X/ betweeni andj 2 N by
dij .X/ D
‰
0; if i andj areinthethesamealliance
1; otherwise
It is becausewesupposethatforanyi andj 2 N i doescarewhetherj belongstothesame
allianceornot,butdoesnotcarewhichalliancej belongsto[2].




sj pij dij .X/
wheresj is thesizeof j , pij is thepropensityof i tobecloseto j , anddij .X/ is thedistancefromi







Whenwerunalgorithm,weuseweightedfrustrationEi.X/ ofagenti in X definedby
Ei.X/ D si Fi .X/ D si
X
j 6Di
sj pij dij .X/:
Ontheotherhand,since,duetothethirdassumption,agenti canidentifyeverypji , j 2 N, we




sj pji dji .X/:
Anbasicideaofouralgorithmisthateachagentisnotsoselfishandcaresaboutheotheragents
intheworldtosomeextent;formally,eachagenti triestoshiftitsallianceinordertodecreaseEi.X/
asmuchaspossible,asfarastheshiftdoesnotincreaseE¡i.X/ towardi . Theideais implemented
asfollows:
1. Thefirst stepcreatesalistof initialalliancestructures.Theinitialalliancestructurescoverall
alliancestructures,orallpossiblepartitionsof N.
2. Thesecondstepselectsanalliancestructure,sayX, fromthelist.
3. At thethirdstepeachagenti generatesasetof adjacentalliancestructurestoX. An adjacent
alliancestructuretoX fori isanalliancestructureinthelistgeneratedfromX byamoveof i .
4. At thefourthstepi selectsitsoptimaladjacentalliancestructureX⁄i bysolvingtheproblem
min
X0:adjucentallianceof X
Ei .X0/ ¡ Ei .X/ s.t. E¡i.X0/ ¡ E¡i .X/ • 0:
X⁄i is suchanalliancestructurethatattainsthelowestvalueamongall theadjacentalliance
structuresto X undertheconditionthatE¡i.X0/ ¡ E¡i .X/ is notpositive.Thisformulation
explicitlyimplementsa kindof group-mindedbehaviorof agentsdescribedabove.X⁄i is an
alliancestructurexpectedtooccurnextoX.
5. Thefifth steprandomlyselectsanagent,sayk, fromN byemployingarouletteselectionrule
andassociatesk withtheoptimalalliancestructureX⁄k obtainedattheprevioustep.The
randomselectionis carriedoutaccordingtotherule:Toeachi weassignprobabilityP.i/ D
.1=si /
1=.6 j .1=sj //
; basedontheideathatthesmallertheagentis,theeasierit canmovebetweenthe
alliances.















LetX beanalliancestructureandAk .k D 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; m/ beanalliancein X, i.e.,X D fAkjk D
1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;mg: LetussupposethenumberofagentsinallianceAk isnk, where
Pm
kD1nk D n. Firstwe
definediscontentofagenti againstj byqij D .1¡ pij /=2; where0• qij • 1andqii D 0: It isclear
thatit takesthehighestvalueif thepropensityis¡1whilethelowestvalueif thepropensityis1.
Next,letusdefinetotal-discontentQi ofagenti 2 Ak asaweightedsumofitsdiscontenttoother
agentsinthesamealliancebyQi.X/ D
P
j2Ak.si=sj /qij . Theweightissetsuchthatdiscontentqij






of total-discontentof theagentsin theallianceis andthemoreuniformtotal-discontentis located
amongtheagentsinit,themorestabletheallianceisfromthelong-termviewpoint.
ThisintuitioninducestabilityindexS.Ak/ of Ak, (k D 1; 2; : : : ;m) definedby
S.Ak/ D C.Ak/R.Ak/
whereC.Ak/ isanindexformeasuringtheuniformitywhileR.Ak/ isoneformeasuringtheaverage.
If R.Ak/ D 0,thenwedefineS.Ak/ D 1. Weadoptheentropyfunction,awell-knownmeasure
of uniformity[5],asC.Ak/; C.Ak/ D ¡
P
i2Ak QQi lognk QQi ; whereQQi D Qi=.
P
i2Ak Qi / is the


















AmericanAirlines(AA) Air France(AF) JapanAirlines(JL)
DeltaAir Lines(DL) BritishAirways(BA) KoreanAir (KE)







Table2alsoshowstwotypesof thenormalizedsizeswithintherangeof0 • s1i ; s2i • 10,where
s1i is thesizeof airlinei measuredbyRP ands
2
i is byRPK whileR.s
1
i / is therankingof airlinei
measuredbyRP andR.s2i / isbyRPK.
Table2:ThevaluesofRP andRPK ofalltheagents







i (million) (million) normalizedRP normalizedRPK
1 AA 86.0 186550 7.2 9.2 2 2
2 DL 119.9 180797 10.0 8.9 1 3
3 UA 85.0 203093 7.1 10.0 3 1
4 NA +KL 74.9 139459 6.2 6.9 4 4
5 AF 40.0 93334 3.3 4.6 8 6
6 BA 44.5 123197 3.7 6.1 6 5
7 LH 47.0 92200 3.9 4.5 5 7
8 NH 43.7 58817 3.6 2.9 7 9
9 CX 11.8 47097 1.0 2.3 11 10
10 JL 33.9 90492 2.8 4.5 9 8
11 KE 22.1 40606 1.8 2.0 10 11
Ontheotherhand,weusesixcriteria,Ir ; 1 • r • 6,toestablishpropensitiesof airlinei to j ,
where1 • i; j • 11. I1 is concernedwithwhetherornoti understandsj isalliance-oriented.I2 is
relatedwithwhetherornot j hascode-shareagreementswithi . Thosearethemostcrucialfactors
forallianceformationaccordingto[3].I3 isconcernedwithwhetherornotthemileageiscreditedto
FFP1 of i whenpassengersof i travelonflightsof j . Althoughthislookssimilarto I2, it is notthe
case.Code-shareagreementsaresetupforimprovingnetworkconnectivity,whileFFP agreementa
arenot.
I4 showswhetherornottherankingof j ishigherthanthatof i bysixinthetwotypesofsizes:
R.s1i / ¡ R.s1j / ‚ 6 andR.s2i / ¡ R.s2j / ‚ 6. I5 expresseswhetherornottherankingof j is lower
thanthatof i bysixin thetwokindsof sizes:R.s1j / ¡ R.s1i / ‚ 6 andR.s2j / ¡ R.s2j / ‚ 6. I4 and
I5 areconcernedwithdifferenceofthesizesbetweentheairlines.Thepresentpapersupposesthatan
airlineismuchlarger/smallerthananotherif therankingsof thesizesof thetwoaredifferentbysix
inbothRP andRPK. Sixmeansjustahalfof thesizeof theindustry.A smallerairlinemaytendto
beafollowerofabiggerone.
I6 expressesthe”regionality”,sinceit isconcernedwithwhetherornotthehomegroundof j is
differentfromthatof i . Thisisthecriterionwhichhasbeenimportantconsideringallianceformation
historically[3].
Basedonthem,foreachi letusdefinemijr D 1 if Ir is satisfied,andmijr D 0otherwise,where
1 • i; j • 11and1 • r • 6. Weassumemiir D 1 foreveryi andr. Then,wecanobtainavector
mij D .mijr /r . Letusillustrateit bytakingthecaseof AmericanAirlines(AA) (i D 1). SinceAA
hascode-shareagreementswithJL (i D 10),wesetm1102 D 1.Byrepeatingsimilarprocedures,we
canobtainm110D .0; 1;1; 0; 1; 1/.
Finally,wedefinepropensitypij by pij D 6rwrmjr ; whereeachweightwr , 1 • r • 6, is
setsuchas.0:10; 0:35; 0:10; 0:05; 0:05; 0:35/. ThesettinghereemphasizesI2 andI6 byassuming
thattheairlinesarebasicallyinterestedin enhancementof networkconnectivityandextensionof
flight networks.Accordingtothedefinition,forexample,propensityof AA toJL is calculatedby




i D 1; 2; : : : ; 7 in Table2. Welimitthenumberof theagentstosevendueto limitationof our
computerabilityaswell. Thepresentactualalliancestructureis expressedby [1; 2; 3; 4; 2;1; 3],




















betweenthetwocases.It implieswhetherweuseARK orRPK doesnotaffecthestability.It
alsoshowsrobustnessofoursimulations.
2. In thebothcaseswecanseethathesecondrankedequilibriumalliancestructurecorresponds
tothepresentactualone.However,theequilibriumalliancestructurewhereBA (i D 6) is
independenthasthehigheststability.It suggestshathepresentOneWorldmaybefragileand




4. Theweightingvectoradoptedsofaremphasizesw2, code-shareagreementsandw6, there-
gionality.Sincetheeffectof theregionalityonallianceformationis clear,wenowexamine




5. Wealsohaveatrywithaweightingvector.0:30;0:05; 0:05; 0:15; 0:15; 0:30/, whichempha-
sizesI1, I4, I5 andI6 byassumingthattheairlinesformalliancesfor seekingmanagement
complementarities.Then,oursimulationsgeneratestableequilibriumalliancesrelativelyin-
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